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Abstract
In this  paper  we examine the case of  Tay,  the Microsoft  AI chatbot  that  was 
launched in March, 2016. After less than 24 hours, Microsoft shut down the experiment 
because the chatbot was generating tweets that were judged to be inappropriate since they 
included  racist,  sexist,  and  anti-Semitic  language.  We  contend  that  the  case  of  Tay 
illustrates a problem with the very nature of learning software (LS is a term that describes 
any  software  that  changes  its  program  in  response  to  its  interactions)  that  interacts 
directly with the public, and the developer’s role and responsibility associated with it. We 
make the case that when LS interacts directly with people or indirectly via social media, 
the developer has additional ethical responsibilities beyond those of standard software. 
There is an additional burden of care.
Keywords: learning software development, responsibility, AI, technologies of humility, 
software profession
Introduction
On March 23, 2016, Microsoft Corporation unveiled a new chatbot they named “Tay.” 
Tay was to interact with human users on the Internet via Twitter and pick up human 
habits of speech (Larson, 2016; Victor, 2016). After less than 24 hours, Microsoft shut 
down the experiment because the chatbot was generating tweets that were judged to be 
inappropriate since they included racist, sexist, and anti-Semitic language.
Soon afterward, Microsoft was widely criticized for deploying Tay in the way that they 
had. Selena Larson wrote, “…Microsoft and Twitter suffer from the same problem: a lack 
of awareness or understanding as to what potential harm these technologies can do, and 
how to prevent it in the first place” (Larson, 2016). This claim is corroborated by the 
statement that Microsoft emailed that included: “Unfortunately, within the first 24 hours 
of coming online, we became aware of a coordinated effort by some users to abuse Tay’s 
commenting skills to have Tay respond in inappropriate ways” (Victor, 2016).
This was not the first time a major U.S. tech company launched web-based software that 
ended  up  embarrassing  the  developers.  In  May  of  2015,  Google  released  “Google 
Photos,”  an  online  bot  that,  among  other  things,  “learned”  from users  how to  label 
photos. Unfortunately, the software was found to be labeling photos of black people as 
“gorillas” (Dougherty, 2015).
In this paper, we will explore the idea that these two incidents are more than isolated 
cases of technical programming errors. We contend that these incidents are symptoms of 
a deeper problem with the very nature of learning software (LS-a term that we will use to 
describe  any  software  that  changes  its  program  in  response  to  its  interactions)  that 
interacts  directly  with  the  public,  the  developer’s  relationship  with  it,  and  the 
responsibility associated with it. We make the case that when LS interacts directly with 
people or indirectly via social media, the developer has additional ethical responsibilities 
beyond those of standard software. There is an additional burden of care.
The differences in the ethical implications between learning and non-learning software 
have been known for some time. In the next section,  we will  identify some previous 
scholarship that warned of the potential ethical problems that arise with the development 
of  learning software.  These concerns  are  exacerbated  today due  to  the prevalence  of 
social media. We use the case of Tay to illustrate these concerns. In the third section, we 
argue that there are additional normative responsibilities for those who develop learning 
software  that  interacts  with  the  general  public.  We  conclude  the  paper  with  a  short 
summary. 
Existing Literature and Its Application to Tay
In  2008,  we  identified  some  of  the  responsibilities  surrounding  the  development  of 
learning software. We wrote:
Our focus in this paper has been on the designers of artificial agents. We 
have argued that these designers need to take great care particularly in 
developing  artificial  agents  that  exhibit  learning*  and  intentionality*. 
However,  we  are  not  arguing  that  designers  are  alone  in  having 
responsibilities  associated  with  such  agents.  The  buyers  of  artificial 
agents, the trainers of neural nets, and anyone who deploys an artificial 
agent (for example, a bot on the Internet or an agent controlling a physical 
robot) all share the responsibility of avoiding harmful consequences that 
might arise from the deployment of the artificial agent. It is not sufficient ORBIT Journal DOI: 2
to claim that ignorance of \an agent’s eventual behaviors insulates these 
stakeholders  from  ethical  claims  regarding  the  agent’s  behaviors.  We 
assert that this ignorance, willful or unintentional, is itself an ethical lapse, 
a lapse that is shared (Grodzinsky, Miller, & Wolf, 2008).
It  should  come  as  no  surprise  that  the  problems  associated  with  Tay surfaced.  The 
application of our 2008 concerns to the case of Tay is obvious, but no less relevant. Based 
on Peter Lee's statement on behalf of Microsoft in response to Tay's bad behavior (Lee, 
2016), it seems that they were well aware that harmful consequences might occur. They 
“planned and implemented a lot of filtering and conducted extensive user studies with 
diverse user groups. We stress-tested Tay under a variety of conditions, ...” (Lee, 2016). 
While  Lee  claims  that  this  was  “a  coordinated  attack  by  a  subset  of  people  [who] 
exploited a vulnerability in Tay” (Lee, 2016), it is unclear whether this vulnerability was 
apparent to the developers prior to or only after the release of Tay. An important point of 
our article quoted above is that LS always has this sort of vulnerability, and therefore, a 
developer of LS should adopt a position of expecting this behavior. The developer cannot 
be  confident  about  knowing  how the  system  will  behave  because  of  the  nature of 
software that learns.
Another important observation is that LS developers need to be more keenly aware of 
their ethical responsibilities. The ACM Code of Ethics says that computer professionals 
must  give  “comprehensive  and  thorough  evaluations  of  computer  systems  and  their 
impacts, including analysis of possible risks” (Anderson et al.,  1992). And, while the 
developers may not have anticipated this particular risk, they should have anticipated that 
Tay  might  behave  in  a  way  they  did  not  anticipate.  Such  a  risk  should  have  been 
mitigated prior to release. Taking Tay offline when it became abusive was reactive, not 
proactive. 
LS that is designed to behave in human-like ways raises additional ethical concerns. In 
2011, we wrote (AA here stands for artificial agent):
Some AA developers are attempting to make AAs more human-like by 
programming them to be more adaptable to their environment by allowing 
them to self-modify their programs. We contend that the potential gains of 
this  strategy are  not  sufficient  to  justify the  enormous risks,  especially 
when the adaptation process is poorly understood by the developer and not 
easily recognized by humans who have e-trust relationships with the AAs. 
We prefer that AAs be boringly predictable. We are far more concerned 
about the trustworthiness of AAs and far less concerned that they mimic 
human adaptability. In almost all situations, we think that AA developers 
have an obligation to the safety of the public. That duty should restrict 
their use of self-modifying code to implement AAs and place limitations 
on the use of neural nets in AAs (Grodzinsky, Miller, & Wolf, 2011).
One of the reasons that Tay was deployed on Twitter was to “experiment” with a learning 
algorithm designed to acquire human conversational skills (Victor, 2016). The fact that 
ORBIT Journal DOI: 3
the  software  ended  up  behaving  in  a  way  that  its  developers  had  not  anticipated 
demonstrates that the Microsoft team released the software without having a clear sense 
of the breadth of possible ways the bot would develop after deployment. As we explained 
in  2011,  we  consider  that  ethically  unacceptable  and  reckless.  The  Latin  proverb 
“ignorantia juris non excusat” is loosely translated “ignorance of the law is no excuse.” 
In the case of LS, we adapt that saying to “ignorance of a program’s future behavior is no 
excuse” for dismissing responsibility for software that one releases. 
More recently, Ibo van de Poel set about developing an ethical framework for evaluating 
new technology (van de Poel,  2016).  In  this  work,  he identifies new technologies  as 
experimental “if there is only limited operational experience with them, so that social 
benefits  and  risks  cannot,  or  at  least  not  straightforwardly,  be  assessed  on  basis  of 
experience”  (van  de  Poel,  2016).  Tay  clearly  meets  this  definition  of  experimental, 
especially since the engineers at Microsoft envisioned Tay as an experiment. Thus, van de 
Poel’s  more  general  moral  principles  for  responsible  experimentation  with  new 
technology, non-maleficence, beneficence, respect for autonomy, and justice, also apply 
here. While a thorough application of the conditions of his ethical framework to this case 
is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that while Microsoft was consistent with the 
some of the principles, there are demonstrable points of inconsistency.
In the remainder of this section we expand on communication styles, deception, and the 
practice of the computing profession as applied to Tay.
Communication styles
According to Daniel Victor, “Microsoft had a fairly reasonable goal here: They wanted to 
develop  better  ‘conversational  understanding’ for  their  products.  Part  of  the  reason 
computers and humans don’t interact well is that humans tend to communicate obliquely 
while robots think literally”(Seitz, 2016). Was this goal realistic?
Alvidrez and Rodriguez have shown that people tend to use different communication 
styles that rely on the social context in which they communicate (Alvídrez & Franco-
Rodríguez, 2016). In order to understand social mobilization facilitated by Twitter, Tay 
would have had to have the power to interpret these styles. Twitter is good for social 
mobilization: “Twitter’s speed and reach have made it a communication tool used widely 
by public figures to attract the attention of users, creating emotional bonds with their 
followers and ultimately, mobilizing people to undertake a concrete action” (Alvídrez & 
Franco-Rodríguez,  2016).  Thus,  we can  understand Microsoft’s  desire  to  harness  this 
power  in  an  automatic  way.  Conversational  understanding  would  be  a  move  in  that 
direction,  albeit  an  unrealistic  one  given  the  limited  ability  of  the  bot.  Alvidrez  and 
Rodriguez indicate that people who use Twitter are trying to ascertain the credibility and 
the  persuasive  effect  of  the  source  by  examining  communication  style,  gender,  and 
congruency of style (Alvídrez & Franco-Rodríguez, 2016). Tay had no way to ascertain 
the credibility of those who manipulated it and, therefore, was easily led to take on their 
antisocial  rhetoric.  It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  our  paper  to  examine  socio-linguistic 
theories  in  depth.  However,  if  Microsoft  were  truly  vested  in  conversational 
ORBIT Journal DOI: 4
understanding,  on  one  hand,  it  might  enquire  how  a  bot  emulating  a  human  would 
convince people that it is a credible source of information, as “…credibility is a basic 
condition for persuading users of marketing web pages or information sources in social 
media” according to Shi, Messaris and Capella (2014). On the other hand, Tay might 
have avoided being “taught” objectionable speech if it were programmed to evaluate the 
credibility of its senders as well.
This is the approach taken by Candid (becandid.com) a social media platform that, rather 
than generate “speech”, uses LS to classify posts as negative or positive statements and 
then give them a score. Posts that are beyond a cut-off are not posted (McEvers, 2016). 
This sort of approach seems to achieve the same sort of goals as Tay, without the breadth 
of risk. Nothing the LS generates is subjected to the public. It still learns a conversational 
understanding. Furthermore, since Candid is designed to read conversations from people, 
there is a chance that this LS will develop a conversational understanding of constructive 
discussion. Essentially, the people that use Candid will be aware of the chance that their 
posts might not meet muster and self-moderate to ensure that their posts are not culled. 
While this may be seen as a threat to free speech, the Candid LS can quite simply inform 
a poster of the apparent offensive nature of the post. The poster can either modify the 
language or, better, Candid could have an appeal process in place that allows developers 
to guide the learning of the LS based on borderline posts. In this way, Candid developers 
have a LS that has minimized its potential for harm. In contrast with Tay, large swaths of 
the public are not subject to the impact of its actions. Any harm is directed at a single 
individual and the broader societal implications are balanced. 
Deception
Deception is  commonplace,  and ultimately software  made for  human interaction will 
have to include sophisticated approaches to recognizing deception in others, and perhaps 
deploying deceptions itself. Nonetheless, it is a tricky feature to get right ethically. In 
2015, we wrote about deceptions in software:
Our default position is that deception is unacceptable and that benign or 
beneficial  deceptions  are  exceptions.  Responsible  developers  should  be 
required to make a strong case-by-case analysis  of any deceptions they 
plan to implement and should justify why a particular deception should be 
an  exception  to  the  default  prohibition.  We believe  that  an  appropriate 
policy  framework  should  be  developed  and  implemented  now.  We 
anticipate  significant  practical,  ethical,  and  legal  problems  in  the 
foreseeable  future  when  AAs  become  increasingly  human-like.  Users 
“enchanted”  by  deceptive  machines  are  likely  to  make  inappropriate 
decisions  based  on  these  deceptions.  Therefore,  we  recommend  that 
developers acknowledge their responsibility to justify any deceptions they 
program into their artifacts (Grodzinsky, Miller, & Wolf, 2015).
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On the one hand it  is clear that Tay is not a human because Tay's  Twitter account is 
clearly identified as belonging to a bot. Yet, Microsoft seemed to promote the idea that 
Tay was acting as a person in subtle, yet powerful ways. Tay's profile image was that of a 
young, white woman. Tay's header photo, although distorted and abstract, also contained 
hints of people's faces. Clearly, the developers were trying to have Tay act as if it were 
human. It is noteworthy that it requires special effort on the part of the user to see the text 
that says Tay is a bot. The suggestive profile image is by default attached to every tweet 
in  a  Twitter  feed.  At  the  very least,  this  is  a  case  where  an  implicit  deception  was 
attempted: trying to make Tay behave in a way that was sufficiently human-like.
 
The Practice of the Computing Profession
Above we suggested that Microsoft did not practice appropriate professional diligence 
with  Tay.  A counter-argument  to  that  claim might  be  that  they  shut  Tay down very 
quickly.  However,  based  on  Lee's  response,  it  is  unclear  how  closely  they  were 
monitoring Tay. Human monitoring of Tay, especially in the first 24 hours it was online, 
is a minimum level of appropriate professional behavior, especially since this was where 
they “expected to learn more” (Lee, 2016). Such monitoring would have resulted in none 
of the offensive behavior being seen by the public. The attackers would not have known 
whether they had been successful in corrupting Tay. They likely would have thought Tay 
was impervious to such an attack. This sort of monitoring would have removed a large 
public stage on which people could misbehave. 
A second concern that stems from Microsoft's reactive taking down of Tay is that it is 
unclear whether the takedown was a reaction to Tay's offensive tweets or a reaction to the 
Twittersphere objecting to the offensive tweets.  Even though Lee says  that  Microsoft 
takes “full responsibility for not seeing this possibility ahead of time” (Lee, 2016), it is 
unclear whether they were the first to see Tay's tweets as being offensive. This raises the 
question of whether Microsoft was so committed to “learning more” that they left Tay up 
for as long as could and only decided to take Tay down when the external pressure made 
it  apparent  that  it  was  necessary.  This  identifies  important  considerations  for  the 
development  of  appropriate  professional  best  practice  for  internal  processes  when 
“releasing” LS to the general public. A web page to report a problem with the software is 
not  sufficient.  Closer  monitoring  by  the  developer  is  an  ethical  imperative  for  LS 
software that has contact with the public.
Traditionally, the in-house part of the development of software typically culminates in the 
testing of that code against some specification. This testing and subsequent fixing is done 
without interaction with the public. There are established best practices, and reputable 
firms adopt those practices, although with some inconsistency from firm to firm as to 
which protocols  are  in  place and how software is  deemed suitable  for release to  the 
public.  When  the  software  meets  some  level  of  closeness  to  the  specification,  it  is 
released to the public. The important point here is that at the point of release, the code is 
fixed. It does not change. Because of that, at a certain level, there is a group of people 
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who understand the code well enough so that when an error occurs, they can at least offer 
some explanation that connects the error to the code.
This is not to say that the public are not involved with the development of this sort of 
software. In beta testing, people who use the software identify errors in the software that 
had escaped notice by the developers and testers. They report these problems back to the 
company and eventually many errors are fixed, and then the developer pushes patches 
back out to the users. Fixes are possible, due to the understanding that the developers 
have  of   code  and  the  error  in  behavior  that  the  code  is  exhibiting.  While  such  a 
connection may not always be immediately apparent to the developers, they eventually 
determine such connections and can offer the sort of explanation mentioned above that 
leads to a thoughtful modification to the code that fixes the error and does not introduce 
new errors.
Simply migrating this model of interaction with the public to LS is not justifiable. We 
note that  LS is  different  from traditional  software in that  the code that  underlies  the 
system is not static while the system is running. A typical implementation for LS includes 
a neural network. Learning systems dynamically make changes to their underlying code 
as  they gain more input  and take  in  responses  to  the output  that  they produce.  It  is  
unlikely that anyone on the development team has the same sort of understanding of the 
underlying code that is commonplace for developers of non-learning software. This lack 
of  understanding is  not  due  to  the  competence  or  professionalism of  the  developers. 
Rather, it is due to the fundamental nature of learning software that effectively precludes 
such knowledge. On the other hand, there are scholars who are beginning to address this 
problem by designing more sophisticated LSs that do have this capability, at least in a 
rudimentary sense (Lei, Barzilay, & Jaakkola, 2016). Another important and immediate 
ethical difference between LS and traditional software is that LS, and especially LS that 
is in contact with the general public, is not in widespread use, and we are in the early 
stages  of  developing our  understanding of  best  practices.  Thus,  LS requires  different 
practices that incorporate a more proactive ethical stance.
Further justification for a more proactive ethical stance in the development of LS is the 
research theme that underlies Microsoft's desire to learn more about Tay. Most software 
developers are not researchers in the traditional sense. Even those software developers 
with PhDs are rarely involved with research that involves people. Learning software puts 
developers at the forefront of experimentation and the use of social media (and other 
technologies such as robotics) makes people an integral part of the research aspect of the 
software development process. Clearly this sort of research calls for an expert in human 
subjects experimentation to be part of the development team. An additional difference is 
that  historically,  this  sort  of  “pure”  research  was  the  purview  of  universities  and 
government labs. While there were clear violations of ethical boundaries over the years, 
university  and governmental  researchers  now abide  by protocols  that  are  in  place  to 
protect the research subjects and the public from potential ill effects of the research and 
the research methodology. Currently, at least in the U.S., there is little in the way of law 
and little public pressure for corporations to adopt similar protocols and practices in their 
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experimentation with technology, which increasingly interacts with people in significant 
ways. 
A final concern with respect to the profession of computing that we reiterate here is that 
fixing errors in LS is  no simple task.  Neural  networks are notoriously opaque.  Their 
developers may not have a deep understanding of relationships between behavior and 
what in the underlying network manifested those behaviors. Even if those relationships 
were  understood,  it  is  unclear  that  we  have  the  expertise  needed  to  make  instant 
modifications to neural networks to mitigate errors and change behaviors of the system.
Extraordinary Responsibilities of Learning Software 
Developers
In this  section we suggest four imperatives for the developers of LS as they develop 
software that  learns through directly engaging with the public.  These imperatives are 
undergirded by Floridi’s distributed morality (DM) in the context of multi-agent systems 
(MAS) in which actions “are assessed on the basis of their impact on the environment 
and its inhabitants” (Floridi, 2013). DM is called for in the cases under study here. The 
developers, the LS, and the trainers constitute the minimal set of agents that share some 
responsibility  in  the  development  of  learning systems.  Floridi’s  analysis  includes  the 
observation  that  most  actions  are  morally  neutral.  However  many  of  them  have  a 
potential bias toward being morally good or morally evil. He calls for the establishment 
of infra-ethics, “a first-order framework of implicit expectations, attitudes, and practices 
that can facilitate and promote morally good decisions and actions” (Floridi, 2013). His 
idea is to foster the development of ethical infrastructures that include moral aggregators, 
which tend to harness actions with a morally good bias, and moral fragmenters, which 
tend to isolate and neutralize actions with morally evil bias. The first imperative is that 
the  initial  learning environment  must  be  controlled  in  some way so that  it  works  to 
“aggregate good actions” and “fragment evil actions.” 
One might argue that the kind of experiment that Microsoft was attempting is a step in 
the  right  direction,  a  way  to  advance  automated  understanding  of  human  language. 
However, like all good science, an experiment whose effects we are trying to understand 
needs a controlled environment with subjects who opt in as volunteers. Microsoft would 
have been better served if it had regulated the conversational input to their bot and then 
experimented with different variables and recorded the perceived changes and responses 
of Tay. That is responsible science, and while we may not like to think that social media 
experimentation as “science,” it, at the very least, deserves the same checks and controls 
as any legitimate scientific experiment because it potentially affects a large demographic. 
If this “experiment” had been proposed in a university setting, it would likely have run 
afoul  of  an  institutional  review  board,  a  body  likely  to  object  to  the  unpredictable 
responses of Tay. We support this objection. But our objection is not a reflection of a 
Luddite position; it is rather a rational insistence on responsible experimentation. Using 
the language of Floridi, we are calling for a system with a moral aggregator in order to 
promote morally good actions. We note that the case of Candid demonstrates a much ORBIT Journal DOI: 8
more  responsible  approach  to  developing  the  same  sort  of  understanding  of  human 
language. It has an ethical infrastructure that isolates clearly morally evil statements. As 
its LS becomes more refined, it will isolate more morally neutral statements that have a 
bias toward moral evil. 
The second imperative is that there needs to be better law and regulation to protect the 
public when a LS uses public involvement. While the Tay experiment is instructive, there 
can be more dire consequences when an LS interacts with the public. The recent case of 
Tesla Motors in which someone was killed due to the autopilot, which is not an LS, in a 
self-driving car failed to distinguish between the sky and a white tractor-trailer brings up 
an important consideration. In this case, the “driver” of the vehicle on autopilot who was 
killed had opted into the experiment (Rushkoff, 2016). On the other hand, the driver of 
the tractor-trailer had not. Even though the autopilot system was not an LS, Tesla was 
conducting  an  experiment  on  U.S.  highways  without  the  same sort  of  oversight  that 
comes with an institutional review. While the National Highway Transportation Safety 
Administration  had approved  the  use  Tesla’s  autopilot  on  the  highways,  the  level  of 
scrutiny was likely not at the same level of concern for the general public as one finds in 
an  institutional  review.  As  Douglas  Rushkoff  reminds  us,  “As  autonomous  vehicle 
proponents  like  to  point  out,  these  problems would be solved if  robotic  cars  weren't 
required to share the road with humans. We people are the problem” (Rushkoff, 2016). 
The  concern  here,  as  applied  to  LS  development,  is  that  the  developers  and  the 
enthusiasts are too close to the decision making process about what constitutes suitable 
risk for the general public who do not know that “they are the problem” for an LS with 
which  they  may  or  may  not  be  interacting.  The  development  of  something  akin  to 
institutional review boards for all LSs that interact with the general public is in order.
Our third imperative for LS developers is one of exceptional transparency and humility 
about what can be known about the LS. We have observed this imperative in academic 
literature  throughout  the  years  with  emerging  technology.  In  the  1980s,  Joseph 
Weizenbaum called for caution (Weizenbaum, 1985) as did Bill Joy in 2000 (Joy, 2000). 
In  2003 Sheila  Jasanoff  called for  “technologies  of  humility”  in  which shortcomings 
regarding  the  uncertainties  and  ambiguities  about  new  technology  are  made  plain 
(Jasanoff,  2003).  It  is  now 2017.  We have not  made enough progress  in  the  area  of 
transparency. In order for a review board to do its work, it must have access to all the 
details about the system, but especially about what is not known about the system. While 
a certain level of confidence about the behavior of non-learning software is intellectually 
justified, the same cannot be said about LS. The wide range of possible behaviors makes 
a similar level of confidence ethically unjustified.
Finally, LS developers must put in place additional safeguards and testing procedures that 
are beyond those used for non-learning software. There must be more testing, more safety 
features, more filtering, and longer lead times before the impact of LS is experienced by 
anyone beyond the development process. As a technology, LS is less well understood and 
more unpredictable than other software. It demands an entirely new set of best practices 
for  its  development.  These  new  best  practices  must  become  the  infra-ethics  for  LS 
developers as quickly as possible.
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Conclusion
Potential  problems  with  the  development  and  deployment  of  artificially  intelligent 
machines  have  been  foreseen  for  many years  in  both  computer  ethics  literature  and 
science  fiction;  yet,  despite  the  warnings,  best  practices  for  the  creation  of  the  LS 
artefacts that interact directly with the public have yet to become prevalent. Our intent in 
this paper was to have a more important message than “we told you so.” Collectively,  
developers  and  stakeholders  alike  need  to  learn  from  these  incidents,  and  behave 
differently in the future. Floridi has a given us one possible mechanism to think through 
the implications of learning software and to structure the environments in which LS will 
operate in order to increase the likelihood of good ethical outcomes. Software developers 
must recognize software that is unpredictable is dangerous by design and take steps to 
limit its interaction with the public until it  has been thoroughly tested in a controlled 
environment. Then, upon limited release, they should inform their customers, their users, 
and the general public not only of the advantages of software that evolve during its use, 
but  also  of  the  vulnerabilities  introduced by unpredictable  consequences  for  changed 
behavior. Then and only then can LS move forward in an ethically responsible manner.
References 
Anderson, R. E., Engel, G., Gotterbarn, D., Hertlein, G. C., Hoffman, A., Jawer, B., … 
Rosenberg, R. S. (1992, October 16). ACM Code of Ethics and Professional 
Conduct. Retrieved July 26, 2016, from https://ethics.acm.org/code-of-ethics/
Alvídrez, S., & Franco-Rodríguez, O. (2016). Powerful Communication Style on Twitter: 
Effects on Credibility and Civic Participation. Comunicar, 24(47). 
https://doi.org/10.3916/C47-2016-09
Floridi, L. (2013). Distributed Morality in an Information Society. Science and 
Engineering Ethics, 19(3), 727–743. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-012-9413-4
Grodzinsky, F. S., Miller, K. W., & Wolf, M. J. (2008). Ethics and Information 
Technology, 10(2–3), 115–121.
Grodzinsky, F. S., Miller, K. W., & Wolf, M. J. (2015). Developing Automated 
Deceptions and the Impact on Trust. Philosophy & Technology, 28(1), 91–105. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-014-0158-7
Jasanoff, S. (2003). Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in Governing 
Science. Minerva, 41(3), 223–244. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025557512320
Joy, B. (2000, April 1). Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us. Retrieved July 13, 2017, from 
https://www.wired.com/2000/04/joy-2/
Dougherty, C. (2015, July 1). Google Photos Mistakenly Labels Black People “Gorillas.” 
Retrieved October 7, 2016, from https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/google-
photos-mistakenly-labels-black-people-gorillas/ORBIT Journal DOI: 11
Larson, S. (2016, March 25). Microsoft’s racist robot and the problem with AI 
development. Retrieved March 27, 2016, from https://www.dailydot.com/debug/tay-
racist-microsoft-twitter/
Lee, P. (2016, March 25). Learning from Tay’s introduction. Retrieved July 27, 2016, 
from https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2016/03/25/learning-tays-introduction/
Lei, T., Barzilay, R., & Jaakkola, T. (2016). Rationalizing Neural Predictions. 
arXiv:1606.04155 [Cs]. Retrieved from http://arxiv.org/abs/1606.04155
McEvers, K. (2016, August 1). Can Candid Conversations Happen Online Without The 
Trolls? Retrieved February 8, 2016, from 
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/08/01/488256587/can-candid-
conversations-happen-online-without-the-trolls
Rushkoff, D. (2016, July 2). Tesla crash highlights real problem behind self-driving cars. 
Retrieved February 8, 2016, from http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/01/opinions/tesla-
self-driving-car-fatality-rushkoff
Seitz, D. (2016, March 24). How Microsoft’s Twitter Experiment Became A Racist 
Nightmare. Retrieved March 27, 2016, from 
http://uproxx.com/technology/microsoft-tay/
Shi, R., Messaris, P., & Cappella, J. N. (2014). Effects of Online Comments on Smokers’ 
Perception of Antismoking Public Service Announcements. Journal of Computer-
Mediated Communication, 19(4), 975–990. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcc4.12057
Victor, D. (2016, March 24). Microsoft Created a Twitter Bot to Learn From Users. It 
Quickly Became a Racist Jerk. - The New York Times. Retrieved August 27, 2016, 
from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/technology/microsoft-created-a-twitter-
bot-to-learn-from-users-it-quickly-became-a-racist-jerk.html
Weizenbaum, J. (1985). Computer power and human reason: from judgment to  
calculation. San Francisco: Penguin Books.
ORBIT Journal DOI: 12
